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I.  INTRODUCTION
November 17, 2010 started and ended like a normal day for most people. 
For working women across the United States, it was another slap in the face. 
The defeat of the Paycheck Fairness Act (“PFA” or “Act”)1 in the U.S. Senate 
delivered a strong blow to the pay equality movement and women across 
the country.2 Among other objectives, the Act sought to provide for punitive 
damages for sex-based pay discrimination and to limit the ability of employers 
to assert that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.3 Ultimately, 
the Act sought to rectify pay discrepancies between the sexes; on average, 
women in the United States make seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned 
by a man.4 
In today’s world, fair and equal pay for equal work should be the norm, 
but, sadly, that is not the case for most American women.5 Although the 
wage gap between men and women has decreased, there is still work to 
be done to bridge that difference.6 The death of the Paycheck Fairness Act 
should not, and cannot, be the end of the fi ght for wage equality.7 This 
Note will contextualize the Paycheck Fairness Act’s importance in the 
1. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009). The Act was reported to 
committee in January of 2009 and then had no movement until it was reintroduced in 2010 
as S. 3772, 111th Cong. (2010) by Senator Reid. Ultimately, despite being approved by the 
House of Representatives, the Senate voted down the bill in November 2010. Pay Equity 
Information, NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-leg.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Pay Equity Information]..
2. See Mark Gruenberg, Senate Kills Paycheck Fairness Act, INT’L LABOR COMMC’NS 
ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2010), http://ilcaonline.org/content/senate-kills-paycheck-fairness-act 
(stating how the Act was defeated along party lines, with the two female Republican 
senators from Maine voting against the Act). 
3. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., HOW THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT WILL STRENGTHEN 
THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT], available 
at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Broad_Paycheck_Fairness_Fact_Sheet.
pdf (noting that the Paycheck Fairness Act would strengthen the remedies available under 
the Equal Pay Act by allowing for liquidated damages and back pay awards, in addition 
to limiting the “factor other than sex” affi rmative defense only to situations where the 
employer can show that the pay differential is related to job performance and consistent 
with a business necessity—and not merely caused by the gender of the employee). 
4. Id.
5. See generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES WORSEN THEIR 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN A DIFFICULT ECONOMY 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER 
WAGES], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/lowerwageshurtwomen.
pdf (observing that while other civil rights laws have helped narrow the wage gap, issues 
still exist in the enforcement of wage equality between sexes).
6. See Closing the Loophole: The Paycheck Fairness Act and Eliminating Caps on 
Damages, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/closing-
loophole-paycheck-fairness-act-and-eliminating-caps-damages [hereinafter Closing the 
Loophole] (stating that “[u]nlike most anti-discrimination statutes, the [Equal Pay Act] 
does not currently allow the award of compensatory or punitive damages” and limits lesser 
paid women to “unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation” and  “an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).
7.  See Gruenberg, supra note 2 (announcing that the leading women’s rights 
organizations would be meeting to discuss future strategy after the defeat of the PFA).
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pay equality movement and for all working women in the United States. 
To that end, Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the pay equality 
movement. Part III will analyze why the Paycheck Fairness Act should be 
enacted and why a remedy is necessary to rectify the current issues in wage 
inequality.
II.  BACKGROUND
A.  What Wage Inequality Really Looks Like
Wage inequality exists not only between the sexes but also across racial 
and national origin lines, state lines, and even among members of white-collar 
professions.8 Census data from 2009 shows, on average, American women 
earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar their male counterparts receive.9 
African-American women make sixty-one cents for each dollar earned by 
white, non-Hispanic men, and Latina women make fi fty-two cents for each 
dollar earned by white, non-Hispanic men.10 The District of Columbia shows 
the smallest wage gap between men and women; with women earning 88.2% 
of what men earn.11 The largest wage gap is seen in Wyoming, where women 
make 65.5% of what men make.12
In October 2010, the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) 
and the NAWL Foundation released a national report on the retention and 
promotion of women in law fi rms.13 In this report, the NAWL found that 
women, while representing approximately 50% of all law school graduates, 
still do not earn as much as their male colleagues.14 Women equity partners 
8.  See, e.g., Kevin Clark & Patrick Maggitti, How Women Can Reduce Their Wage 
Gap, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/women-
compensation-pay-leadership-careers-ceiling.html (discussing a study among white-collar 
professionals enrolled in MBA programs that looked at, among other factors, compensation 
among men and women).
9.  NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1 & n.2 (utilizing U.S. Census 
Bureau income data for persons aged fi fteen and older of Hispanic origin). 
10.  See id.; NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009, at 1 
(2009) [hereinafter NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/Ledbetter%20Fair%20Pay%20Act%20of%202009%20-%20Summary%20
of%20case%20and%20Bill.pdf.
11.  See Wage Gap Persists in All 50 States Fact Sheet, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/wage-gap-persists-all-50-states (citing U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EARNINGS BY STATE: 2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-3.pdf).
12.  Id.
13.  See STEPHANIE A. SCHARF & BARBARA M. FLOM, THE NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS 
& THE NAWL FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION 
AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3–4 (2010), http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.
com/fi les/NAWL%202010%20Final(1).pdf (fi nding that women are underrepresented in 
law fi rm leadership, as they only account for 15% of the equity partners, are not listed as 
major rainmakers, and earn less than their male counterparts). 
14.  See id. at 2, 3–4 (observing that, despite the fact that women make up fi fty percent 
of the law school graduates, women only account for fi fteen percent of equity partnership 
in law fi rms and earn less than their male counterparts). 
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make 85% of what their male counterparts make.15 Moreover,  although 
associate pay is generally “on a par” for both men and women, wage gaps 
begin to appear as women move higher up in the law fi rm hierarchy.16
B.  Legislative Background
The Civil Rights era saw the passage of two important pieces of legislation 
related to sex-based discrimination: the Equal Pay Act of 196317 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,18 signed into law by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
(respectively).19 The Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA);20 among other requirements, the Equal Pay Act 
established a minimum wage for employees.21 The primary aim of the Equal 
Pay Act was to prohibit the payment of unequal wages between men and 
women for equal work.22 At that time, women were earning fi fty-nine cents to 
every dollar earned by men.23 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 
1964 in an effort to continue President Kennedy’s civil rights legislation after 
President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.24 Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act covers employment-based discrimination of protected classes, one of 
which is sex.25 
The Equal Pay Act mandates the payment of equal wages to men and women 
in the same establishment when they perform equal work; provided that their 
15.  Id. at 4.
16.  See id. at 21–22 (emphasizing that even though the survey found that the associate 
compensation appears to be equal, differentials begin to appear at the counsel, non-equity, 
and equity partner levels, with female counsel earning eighty-eight percent, non-equity 
partners earning ninety-four percent, and equity partners earning eighty-fi ve percent of 
what their male counterparts earn).
17.  Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codifi ed as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).
18.  Pub. L. No. 88-325, 78 Stat. 241 (codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2006)).
19. See Overview of the Equal Pay Act, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN http://www.
aauw.org/act/laf/library/payequity_epa.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (stating the Equal 
Pay Act extended wage protection to women, while Title VII broadened protections to all 
employment actions based on protected classes—including sex).
20. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201–19 (2006).
21.  See § 206(d) (prohibiting discrimination based on sex in the payment of wages).
22.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (noting that President Kennedy signed the 
Equal Pay Act into law, making the payment of unequal wages illegal because he thought 
of the Equal Pay Act as an essential component of the civil rights movement).
23.  Id.; see Albert H. Ross & Frank V. McDermott, Jr., The Equal Pay Act of 1963: 
A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (claiming that the 
Equal Pay Act was a result of the call of the War Labor Board for adjustments to equalize 
the wage and salary rates of men and women that was later adopted by the Commission on 
the Status of Women, created by President Kennedy). 
24.  See RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART 
OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 14 (2001) (recalling President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
comments  to Congress that “no ‘memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor 
President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for 
which he fought so long.’”).
25.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (providing that it is “unlawful . . . to apply 
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment [on the basis] of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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jobs “require[] equal skill, effort, and responsibility;” and they work under 
similar working conditions.26 However, the Act allows differences in wages 
if an employer bases the wage differential on “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”27
Nevertheless, despite the passage of both of these important pieces of 
legislation, women still receive less pay than their male counterparts for 
doing equal work.28 Loopholes in both laws allow employers to justify paying 
different wages to male and female employees doing equal work.29
C.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Lilly Ledbetter was a female manager at Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama.30 She worked for the company from 
1979 until 1998.31 By the time Ledbetter retired in 1998, she had attained 
the position of Area Manager.32 She was one of a few female supervisors at 
the Gadsden plant and she faced many instances of sexual harassment while 
working there.33 At one point, her male supervisor allegedly told her that 
“‘women didn’t belong in the company.’”34 This supervisor consistently rated 
her near the bottom of all Area Managers each performance year.35 Another 
supervisor offered her a better evaluation in exchange for sexual favors.36
26.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
27. Id.
28. See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (highlighting the fact that although the 
wage gap has narrowed there is a substantial need to change the current law to ensure that 
the wage gap between sexes ceases to exist). 
29.  See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS: CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER 
THAN SEX” GAP IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS], 
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/FactorOtherThanSex.pdf (noting 
evidence of employers using the loopholes provided under § 206(d)(1) to justify otherwise 
illegal practices and stating the need to readdress the gaps of the law). 
30.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (observing 
that during Ledbetter’s nineteen-year tenure at Goodyear, salaried managers received—or 
were denied—“raises based on their supervisors’ evaluation of their performance”).
31.  Id.
32.  See Bindu George, Note, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: A Court Out of Touch With the 
Realities of the American Workplace, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 253, 256 (2008) 
(stating that although Ledbetter was an Area Manager, in 1997, on the advice of her male 
supervisor, Ledbetter applied for and received the non-supervisory position of Technology 
Engineer, but she still functioned as an Area Manager).
33.  NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1.
34.  Paula A. Monopoli, In A Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & 
U.L. 555, 560 (2008) (indicating that the supervisor that made this comment refl ected his 
opinion of women not belonging at Goodyear by making sure that she received lower pay 
increases than her male counterparts over the years).
35.  See George, supra note 32, at 255 (noting that Ledbetter was ranked twenty-third 
out of twenty-four salaried employees).
36.  Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 499, 508 (2010) (detailing the sexual harassment that Ledbetter faced from 
several male employees at her time at Goodyear, when she complained to management 
no action was taken, and when she fi nally complained to EEOC, after which she faced 
retribution from her coworkers). 
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During her employment, Ledbetter was unaware that she was being paid 
less than her male counterparts.37 While some of her male co-workers bragged 
about how much they made working overtime, the company had a policy that 
did not allow employees to discuss their pay among themselves.38 Ledbetter 
had received raises throughout the years but had no idea that the difference in 
pay was signifi cant.39 It was not until Ledbetter received an anonymous note 
informing her that she was being paid less than her male colleagues that she 
suspected pay discrepancy.40 At the conclusion of 1997, Ledbetter was earning 
$3,727 per month, in contrast with the lowest paid male area manager who 
made $4,286 a month, and the highest paid male area manager who made 
$5,236 a month.41 Consequently, Ledbetter fi led a formal charge alleging sex-
based discrimination with the EEOC in July 1998.42 In November 1998, she 
fi led suit in federal district court and alleged violations of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act.43
The district court allowed Ledbetter’s Title VII claim to proceed to trial 
but granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear for the Equal Pay Act 
claim and several other of her claims.44 A jury found for Ledbetter on her 
Title VII discrimination claim and awarded her back pay plus damages.45 
37.  NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1. 
38.  Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (describing how, when Ledbetter fi rst began 
working for Goodyear, all of the supervisors were paid the same but as time passed, 
Goodyear adopted a subjective performance-based system in which employees were told 
that the amount that they were paid was strictly confi dential). For more on the illegality 
under Title VII of employer pay scale schemes which allow management to base promotion 
and wages on characteristics other than on their performance, see, for example, Carpenter 
v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 706 F.2d 608, 613, 633 (5th Cir. 1983), which held 
that a pay plan that arbitrarily assigned predominantly blacks and women to lower paying 
job classifi cations would be illegal under Title VII and affected employees would be 
entitled to back pay.   
39.  See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (recounting that some of Ledbetter’s pay 
raises were “pretty good, percentage-wise,” which led her to believe that there was not a 
substantial disparity between her pay and the pay of male employees doing the same job 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
40.  See id. (observing that after Ledbetter found out she was paid substantially less 
than her male counterparts, that discovery provoked her to quickly go to the EEOC and fi le 
a formal claim against Goodyear). 
41. See Monopoli, supra note 34, at 563 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
42. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621–22 & n.1 (2007) 
(majority opinion), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
43. Id. at 621–22.
44.  Id. at 622.
45.  Id.; see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003 
WL 25507253, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003) (stating that Ledbetter was awarded 
approximately $3.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the back 
pay award), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded 
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; see also 
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508–09 (stating that the jury awarded Ledbetter three million 
dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, but “the trial judge reduced the damage 
award to $300,000” due to the Title VII statutory damages award cap).
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Goodyear appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and contended that Ledbetter’s 
pay discrimination claims were time-barred before her EEOC contact.46  The 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that a plaintiff 
“can state a timely [Title VII pay discrimination claim] for disparate pay only 
to the extent that the ‘discrete acts of discrimination’ of which she complains, 
occurred within the limitations period created by her EEOC questionnaire. 
Any acts of discrimination affecting her salary occurring before then are time-
barred.”47
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ledbetter sought review of the following 
question: 
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination 
when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, 
but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred 
outside the limitations period.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on November 
27, 2006.49 Then, on May 29, 2007—nearly ten years after Ledbetter fi rst 
contacted the EEOC—the Supreme Court, in a fi ve to four decision, affi rmed 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the discriminatory acts claimed by Ledbetter 
were untimely and that her claim was time-barred.50
D.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
In 2009, in one of his fi rst acts as President, President Obama signed into 
law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009—which superseded the Court’s 
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear.51 The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restored the 
rights taken away by the Court’s decision in Ledbetter and established that 
“pay discrimination claims on the basis of sex, race, national origin, age, 
46.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), 
Ledbetter’s claims of discrimination were time-barred under the statute of limitations 
created by her EEOC questionnaire), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
47.  Id. at 1180. 
48.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 548 
U.S. 903 (2006) (No. 05–1074).
49.  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618.
50.  The majority of the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, upheld the 
decision of the Eleventh Circuit and held that because a pay decision is an act that is made 
at a particular point in time, an EEOC statutory period begins when the act occurs. Id. at 
621. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, authored a dissenting 
opinion that claims that the majority is incorrect and that the 180-day statutory period 
should be combined for each offense, rather than run for each offense individually, because 
pay disparities accumulate over time. Id. at 646–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
51.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (2006)); see Carolyn E. Sorock, Note, Closing the Gap Legislatively: 
Consequences of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2010) 
(noting that several Republican Senators feared that, without deadlines for fi ling, suits over 
pay discrimination would be unduly burdensome for businesses).  
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religion, and/or disability ‘accrue’” with each discriminatory act.52   Qualifying 
discriminatory acts include the receipt of a discriminatory paycheck, the 
adoption of or an employee’s subjection to a “discriminatory pay decision or 
practice.”53 Whenever such an act occurs, a pay discrimination claim can move 
forward under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.54  Moreover, the Act is effective as 
of the day prior to the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision.55
Since the enactment of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, several cases have applied 
the expanded statutory time limitations period.56 Courts have confi rmed 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s greater statutory timeframe by allowing each 
discriminatory paycheck to renew the limitations period for pay discrimination 
claims.57 As such, each time an employee receives a paycheck based on a 
discriminatory pay decision, the time period in which an employee mayt fi le 
an EEOC complaint starts anew.
Despite the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, other issues still exist in 
the fi ght for equal pay. One issue concerns the meaning of the clause:  “when 
an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice.”58 Courts have interpreted this phrase in different ways and have 
reached different outcomes.59 Additionally, what qualifi es as a “compensation 
52.  NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009: ONE YEAR 
LATER 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER], available at http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Ledbetter_FPA_One_Year_Later.pdf.
53.  Id. 
54.  Id.
55.  Id. 
56.  See, e.g., Mikula v. Alleghany Cnty. (Mikula I), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that each discriminatory paycheck renewed the time for fi ling a pay discrimination 
claim under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act), rev’d, 583 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009); Hester v. N. 
Ala. Ctr. for Educ. Excellence, 353 F. App’x 242, 243–44 (11th Cir. 2009) (fi nding that 
the plaintiff’s claim was timely under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Johnson v. District of 
Columbia, 632 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2009) (reinstating the plaintiff’s claims after 
the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and stating “there can be no dispute that, under 
the Fair Pay Act, plaintiff may seek relief under” the relevant federal laws); Goodlett v. 
Delaware, No. 08-298-LPS, 2009 WL 585451, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2009) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s pay disparity claim survived after the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
and “the 300-day clock for fi ling a Title VII pay disparity claim starts anew with each 
discriminatory pay period”). 
57.  See NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 52, at 1.  
58.  42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
59.  Compare Mikula I, 320 F. App’x at 136 (holding under Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that plaintiff’s claims were untimely, due to 
the fact that they were not fi led within 180 days of the occurrence with the EEOC), with 
Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty. (Mikula II), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter 
and holding that the plaintiff’s claim was timely). See, e.g., Schengrund v. Pa. State Univ., 
705 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432–33 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (articulating that plaintiffs “may recover 
for each and every paycheck received from the present dating back to 300 days prior 
to their fi ling with the EEOC”). But cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1973 
(2009) (holding that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not apply in the calculation of pension 
benefi ts calculated, in part, under an accrual rule). See generally Sorock, supra note 51, 
at 1212–13 (discussing, in detail, the various judicial responses to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act).
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decision” under the Act varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.60
E.  Paycheck Fairness Act
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) 
introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act in January 2009 to remedy some of the 
shortcomings of the Fair Pay Act.61 One aim of the bill was to strengthen the 
amount of damages a prevailing plaintiff could recover; another goal was to 
close a loophole in one of the four affi rmative defenses available to employers 
under the Equal Pay Act.62 Nevertheless, despite approval by the House of 
Representatives, the Senate rejected the Paycheck Fairness Act on November 
10, 2010.63
III.  DISCUSSION
A.  Congress Should Reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act or Otherwise 
Remedy the Issues the PFA Sought to Address
While the Fair Pay Act restored the rights the Ledbetter decision removed, 
there are still problems that persist with the enforcement of equal pay for equal 
work.64 First, the Equal Pay Act provides an employer with an affi rmative 
defense when the employer can show that it based the allegedly discriminatory 
pay differential on a factor other than sex.65 Many employers use this defense 
to defeat plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act claims by asserting the reason for differences 
between two employees’ pay is not sex.66 The Paycheck Fairness Act would 
have closed this loophole by requiring the employer to show the following: 
that it used a “bona fi de factor . . . not based upon or derived from a sex-based 
60.  See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009: 
CURRENT STATUS AND EMERGING ISSUES 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES], 
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/Ledbetter_Act_Current_Status_
and_Emerging_Issues.pdf (showing different types of claims that have been raised under 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and how different jurisdictions have ruled).
61. Pay Equity Information, supra note 1.
62.  See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (stating that other 
aims include: improving the remedies available; facilitating class action claims; prohibiting 
employer retaliation, modifying the “establishment” requirement; improving the collection 
of pay information by the EEOC; and reinstating pay equity programs and enforcement at 
the Department of Labor).
63.  See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Pay Equity 
Information, supra note 1 (stating the vote was 58–41, mostly along party lines).
64.  See NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES, supra note 60, at 2–3 (discussing problems of 
interpretation that have come before the courts, including problems with retroactivity and 
problems with the actual reach of the Act).
65.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (providing four exemptions to the general 
prohibition of pay disparity); see also NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 24, at 2–3 
(noting that a number of courts have allowed “factors other than sex” exemptions in their 
decisions, resulting in employers’ being allowed to pay male employees more than female 
employees).  
66.  See NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 2 (asserting that judicial 
misinterpretation of the “factors other than sex” defense would be remedied with the 
Paycheck Fairness Act).
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differential;” that the “factor other than sex” was “job-related to the position 
in question;” and that use of a “factor other than sex” to distinguish pay was 
“consistent with business necessity.”67 Under the Paycheck Fairness Act, if the 
employee could show that “an alternative employment practice” could have 
served “the same business purpose without producing a pay differential and 
the employer refused to adopt” the practice, then the employer would not have 
prevailed on the “factor other than sex” defense.68
A second aim of the PFA was to increase the amount of damages awarded to a 
prevailing plaintiff.69 Unlike awards under Title VII or the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, awards under the Equal Pay Act do not include 
compensatory or punitive damages.70 The prevailing plaintiff in an Equal Pay 
Act claim is entitled to back pay during the relevant limitations period and an 
additional, equal, amount as liquidated damages.71 Usually, the award of back 
pay and liquidated damages is not very large.72 By not being allowed to receive 
compensatory or punitive damages, victims of sex-based wage discrimination 
receive different treatment than other workplace discrimination victims.73
 B.  Application: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
An example of how wage inequality has emerged in a non-white-collar 
professional setting is Dukes v. Wal-Mart.74 Here, a female employee, Betty 
Dukes, who initially had received an excellent ninety-day review and a 
promotion, alleged that she later experienced discrimination and retaliation 
67.  Id. at 4. 
68.  Id.
69.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (detailing that the Paycheck Fairness Act 
would allow for both compensatory and punitive damages and would eliminate the cap on 
damages).
70.  See also NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that 
the Equal Pay Act does not permit the award of compensatory or punitive damages); cf. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (providing for back pay and reinstatement but no other 
damages).
71.  See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (comparing the 
remedies of the Equal Pay Act with those of the Paycheck Fairness Act and fi nding the 
Paycheck Fairness Act remedies of compensatory and punitive damages superior).
72.  See id. (noting that damage awards under the Equal Pay Act are insubstantial on 
the whole).
73.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (observing that the Equal Pay Act 
remedies are not as far-reaching as those in other anti-discrimination statutes).
74.  603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, No. 10-277 (U.S. argued Mar. 29, 2011).
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for complaining to her District Manager.75 Dukes claimed that her supervisors 
never gave her the opportunity to train for higher-level and higher-paying 
positions and reprimanded her more harshly for mistakes than her male 
counterparts.76 Dukes, along with six other female employees, fi led a class 
action suit on June 8, 2001.77 The plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart pays women 
less than men in comparable positions, even when the lower-paid women have 
higher performance ratings and greater seniority than their male counterparts, 
and that women “receive fewer—and wait longer for—promotions to in-store 
management positions.”78 In addition, they allege that Wal-Mart’s corporate 
culture encourages “gender stereotyping and discrimination” and that this 
treatment “is common to all women who work or have worked in Wal-Mart 
stores.”79
One issue is whether it was appropriate for the district court to grant class 
certifi cation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 On December 6, 
2010, the Supreme Court granted Wal-Mart’s petition for certiorari and heard 
oral argument on March 29, 2011.81 
This case is important because of its potential social ramifi cations.82  Wal-
Mart, a large corporation, is one of the largest employers in the United States.83 
A favorable outcome for Dukes and the other plaintiffs would send a strong 
message not only to Wal-Mart, but to other employers as well; discriminatory 
promotion and compensation policies toward female employees are 
75.  See WAL-MART WATCH, BETTY V. GOLIATH: A HISTORY OF DUKES V. WAL-MART 
5 (2006), available at http://walmartwatch.com/img/blog/dukes_backgrounder.pdf 
(recounting allegations that Ms. Dukes experienced retaliation through “1) discipline 
for procedures regularly used by male employees without being reprimanded; 2) not 
allowing her to train for a department manager position; 3) demotion to cashier and being 
falsely accused of violating company policy while performing a transaction that had been 
performed many times by Ms. Dukes and other employees in the past without incident; 
4) a reduction in hours and hourly wage; 5) not being informed of at least four un-posted 
promotional opportunities (department and/or support manager positions) for which she 
would have been eligible but were each fi lled by males; and, 6) being discouraged from 
applying for future department manager positions”).
76.  Id. at 5. 
77.  603 F.3d 571, 577–78 (noting plaintiffs’ class alleged rampant Title VII 
violations).
78.  Id. at 577.
79.  Id. at 577–78.
80.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring commonality of facts for all members of 
the representative class in order to permit certifi cation); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting certiorari to the question of “[w]hether the class 
certifi cation ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a)”).
81.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). 
82.  See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4–5 (discussing the potential important 
implications of Dukes for consumers, investors, and employees alike, such as, risk to the 
“Wal-Mart ‘brand’ in the public eye”).
83. See WALMART, CORPORATE FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at http://www.
walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf (stating that Wal-Mart is one of the largest 
private employers in the United States).
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intolerable.84 As one attorney, who represents the Dukes class, explained the 
crux of the issue, “People keep shopping at Wal-Mart because they don’t con-
nect the fact that the low price they’re paying is effectively subsidized by the 
woman at the checkout counter.”85 
IV.  CONCLUSION
D espite the existing laws protecting wage equality, wage inequality 
remains. Savvy employers are able to defeat many legitimate EPA claims 
simply by asserting that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.86 
When employees do prevail, the damages they obtain are generally a drop in 
the bucket for their employers.87 Given the tough fi nancial times that most 
Americans have been facing during this recession, women suffer harder hits to 
their wallet than men do as a result of the pay disparity.88 
However, the political makeup of the 112th Congress makes it unclear 
whether any member of Congress will reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act 
and put it up for another vote before 2013. Regardless, the fi ght for equal 
pay for equal work must continue. Forty-eight years out from the passage 
of the Equal Pay Act, signifi cant wage gaps between men and women are 
unacceptable. 
84.  See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4, 9 (stating that this litigation is being 
watched closely by competitors while law fi rms are releasing reports to their clients on how 
to avoid similar class-action employment litigation).
85.  Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
86.  NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 1. 
87.  See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (“Employers would gamble that it costs 
less to pay damages than to create workplaces free of discrimination.”).
88.  See NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1–2. At least one reason 
that wage gaps continue—and are exacerbated—in a bad economy are cultural perceptions 
that women are only secondary contributors to household income. See e.g. Steger v. Gen. 
Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (detailing that one of the reasons that 
management told Steger that she could not have a wage increase was because she did not 
“need” one since she could rely on her husband’s salary).  
